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NICOLÁS LO GUERCIO1 
ABSTRACT: In a recent paper García-Carpintero (2017) argues that proper names pos-
sess, in addition to their standard referential truth conditional content, metalinguistic 
descriptive senses which take part in semantic presuppositions. The aim of this article 
is twofold. In the first part I present an argument against García-Carpintero’s presuppo-
sitional view, which I call the collapse argument. In short, I argue that the view has the 
unwelcome consequence of making contexts of use and felicitous contexts of use col-
lapse. If this is correct, a presuppositional account of the metalinguistic descriptions 
allegedly associated with proper names proves incorrect. In the second part I sketch an 
alternative Millian strategy which is able to account for the evidence which allegedly 
supports the presuppositional view. 
KEYWORDS: Pragmatics – presupposition – proper names – semantics. 
1. The Mill-Frege theory of proper names 
 In order to understand García-Carpintero’s theory (The Mill-Frege The-
ory of proper names) it is convenient to start by pointing at a number of 
assumptions on which such theory rests. The first one is the Kaplanian dis-
tinction between generic and specific names. A generic name consist just 
                                                          
1  Received: 29 June 2018 / Accepted: 13 August 2018 
  Nicolás Lo Guercio 
  Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas (IIF) 
  Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) 
  Pte. Luis Sánez Peña 1177, (1110), Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina 
  e-mail: nicolasloguercio@gmail.com 
 S O M E  R E M A R K S  O N  T H E  M I L L - F R E G E  T H E O R Y  O F  N A M E S  443 
in a phonological or orthographical articulation, i.e. a pattern of sounds or 
ink-marks. Specific names, in turn, are individuated by an historical event, 
to wit, the act of naming by means of which the name was created (I’ll say 
a little bit more about acts of naming below). Crucially, for García-
Carpintero names that occur bare in argument position are specific names, 
not generic ones. The second assumption is Properism, roughly the view 
that all the objects named John possess different specific names, say John1, 
John2, John3…, which share the same phonological and orthographical ar-
ticulation.2 Finally, García-Carpintero adopts a way of understanding the 
semantics/pragmatics divide according to which the semantic dimension is 
not restricted to the truth conditional realm but it comprehends “any mean-
ing feature belonging to a type constitutive of the nature of languages (so 
that any attempt at characterizing a possible language having any chance 
of being the actual language of a population which overlooks that type of 
feature is thereby inadequate)…” (García-Carpintero 2000, 112). 
 With this in mind, let’s now summarize the main points of the Mill-
Frege view. First, the view is token-reflexive: concrete referents are as-
cribed to name-tokens, namely concrete actual or possible uses of expres-
sions, as opposed to the more standard Kaplanian occurrences (cf. García-
Carpintero 1998; 2000 for a discussion of the token-reflexive view). Sec-
ond, the view is Millian in the following sense: it grants that the only truth 
conditional contribution of a name-token to the utterance of which it takes 
part is its referent. Thus, unlike some forms of descriptivism, the Mill-
Frege theory does not claim that names are synonymous with definite de-
scriptions, metalinguistic or otherwise. Still, proper names are semantically 
associated with descriptive metalinguistic senses, which figure in semantic 
presuppositions triggered by tokens of them. What takes us to the third 
point: the Mill-Frege theory maintains that a token n of a specific proper 
name Ni carries a semantic presupposition of the form ‘𝑥𝑥 is the unique in-
dividual picked out in the act of naming instituting the Ni-appellative prac-
tice to which n belongs’ (García-Carpintero 2017, 26). This presupposition 
is an instance of a schematic rule, which is said to be part of the linguistic 
knowledge of any competent speaker, of the form 
                                                          
2  The view contrasts with Commonerism, viz. the position that all Johns share the 
same name. 
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Ni = For any use n of proper name Ni, n refers to x if and only if x is 
the unique individual picked out in the act of naming instituting the 
Ni-appellative practice to which n belongs. (García-Carpintero 2017, 
26) 
 García-Carpintero adopts a Stalnakerian view on presuppositions. Very 
roughly, on this view an utterance presupposes a proposition p if it is inap-
propriate unless p belongs to the common ground, that is, to the set of prop-
ositions commonly accepted by the conversational partners (otherwise it 
has to be accommodated by the audience). Stalnaker’s view is considered 
a pragmatic view, usually opposed to the semantic, Strawsonian view on 
presuppositions. According to García-Carpintero, however, Stalnaker’s ap-
proach is compatible with the existence of some presuppositions being se-
mantic in the traditional sense (cf. García-Carpintero 2000 and 2016). Very 
roughly, an utterance (semantically) presupposes a proposition p if (i) the 
truth of p is required for the utterance to have a truth value and (ii) the 
presupposition is triggered by the conventional meaning of some expres-
sion in the sentence. On the Mill-Frege view presuppositions associated 
with proper names are semantic in exactly that sense: they are triggered by 
the conventional meaning of the name and their truth is required for the 
name to refer, hence for the utterance to possess a truth value. 
 We already said in which sense the theory is Millian. The last paragraph 
makes it clear in which sense it is Fregean: on the one hand, the view con-
tends that names are semantically associated with descriptive senses, which 
are part of the linguistic knowledge shared by competent speakers; on the 
other hand, the view has it that descriptive senses fix the reference, i.e. they 
figure in semantic presuppositions the truth of which is required for the 
name to refer, thus for the utterance to have a truth value. 
 Let me end this brief summary by saying a few words on acts of naming. 
On the Mill-Frege theory acts of naming are ‘purposeful events, instituting 
linguistic conventions, appellative practices’ (García-Carpintero 2017, 16), 
thereby creating a new specific name and fixing a referent for it. Acts of 
naming can be explicit or implicit. In the former case, they constitute a 
directive speech act, a plea or request to create a new expression, i.e. to 
conventionally associate a given object with a generic name (a phonologi-
cal or orthographical articulation) and to conform future practice to that 
convention. In the latter case the name comes into existence just by being 
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presumed to exist, provided that the community goes along with that pre-
sumption. Finally, acts of naming can be successful or not. When they are, 
a new specific name comes into existence, and the relevant object becomes 
the semantic referent of that name. 
 These are the main theses of the Mill-Frege theory. With these in mind 
I will discuss, in the next section, what I think is the main problem for this 
presuppositional approach to proper names. 
2. The collapse argument 
 In line with the tradition (Karttunen 1974, Stalnaker 1974) we can think 
of presuppositions as restrictions on appropriate or felicitous contexts of 
use. Put differently, presuppositions restrict the contexts in which a sen-
tence can be felicitously used to those in which the presupposition is satis-
fied: in the case of pragmatic presuppositions felicitous contexts are those 
in which the presupposition is part of the common ground; in the case of 
semantic presuppositions, felicitous contexts are those in which the presup-
position is true. Thus, whenever an expression triggers a presupposition 
there is a set of contexts, viz. the ones in which the presupposition fails, in 
which using the expression would be inappropriate. By way of illustration, 
consider a presupposition typically thought of as semantic in nature, like 
the existence presupposition in 
 (1)  The king of France is bald. 
If I use (1) and there is no king of France, I have used the expression infe-
licitously. As a consequence, the story goes, the description does not de-
note and the utterance lacks a truth value. Something analogous can be said 
for the case of indexicals, at least on a presuppositional account (García-
Carpintero 2000). On this view, these expressions possess a relational 
property involving any use, which is mutually known by hearer and speaker 
on the basis of linguistic knowledge alone, it is reasonably individuative 
and fixes the reference of the expression in a context. As in the case of 
proper names, this property is said to be part of a semantic presupposition 
associated with the expression. In the case of demonstratives, the presup-
positional rule goes as follows: 
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That = For any use that of that, that refers to x if and only if x is the 
unique entity (in a contextually specified class F) ‘demonstrated’ when 
that is produced. (García-Carpintero 2017, 10) 
Here, again, if I use that without there being a unique entity demonstrated 
in the context I have used the expression inappropriately, and as a conse-
quence my token does not refer and the utterance lacks a truth value. 
 If names trigger semantic presuppositions we expect the same behav-
iour: there should be some contexts in which I use a name but, since the 
presupposition is not satisfied, my use is infelicitous thus the name fails to 
refer and the utterance lacks a truth value.3 However, there is a key differ-
ence between the case of definite descriptions and demonstratives and that 
of proper names. According to García-Carpintero ‘each instance of Ni is a 
rule associated with a specific proper name: a word individuated by its lin-
guistic features, in particular the semantic one constituted by the act of 
naming which fixes its reference’ (García-Carpintero 2017, 26, my empha-
sis). Moreover, on the Mill-Frege theory of names, whether a given token 
n is a token of a certain specific name, Ni, is also determined by its linguis-
tic features, in particular by the fact that it exploits the Ni-appellative prac-
tice instituted by a certain concrete historical act of naming which fixed its 
reference. Put differently, the property of being related with this or that 
original act of naming or appellative practice is individuative of the specific 
name Ni and tokens of it. 
                                                          
3  At this point a clarification is needed. We expect the same behaviour from definite 
descriptions, demonstratives and proper names only as long as we assume (following 
García-Carpintero) that the three kinds of expressions carry a semantic presupposition. 
On that assumption, we expect presupposition failure to lead to an infelicitous use in 
the three cases. Now, although it is standard to associate a semantic presupposition to 
definite descriptions, it is less standard to do so in the case of demonstratives and proper 
names. Here, for the sake of the argument, I follow García-Carpintero in granting the 
existence of a semantic presupposition in the three cases in order to show, in the end, 
that proper names behave different both from (i) expressions commonly thought to 
carry a semantic presupposition, like definite descriptions and (ii) expressions not so 
commonly thought to carry a semantic presupposition, but which García-Carpintero 
himself would classify as involving semantic presuppositions, like demonstratives. 
Thanks to a reviewer for Organon F for signaling this point.  
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 This point is clear on García-Carpintero discussion of Madagascar-like 
cases (García-Carpintero 2017, 18-20). There, he explicitly sides with 
Sainsbury (2005), and against Sainsbury (2015), in claiming that in Mada-
gascar-like cases there is no change of reference of the same specific name, 
but the creation of a new appellative practice, hence of a new specific 
name. In other words, he rejects Sainsbury’s (2015) claim that the historical 
chain that determines the same-name relation and that which determines 
the same-referent relation are different. In turn, he contends that 
this ignores a semantic constitutive role that the previous considerations 
show acts of naming to have. In a nutshell: they are intended to intro-
duce a word; words are individuated in part by their semantic features; 
names, like indexicals, are de jure constitutively referential expres-
sions, whose semantic referent is determined relative to what transpired 
at a particular act of naming. (García-Carpintero 2017, 20) 
This raises a problem. If acts of naming and appellative practices are indi-
viduative of specific proper names and in addition, they are part of their 
presuppositional content, then presupposition failure, i.e. a token n not be-
ing associated with any act of naming/appellative practice, does not merely 
prevents the speaker from using the name felicitously but it prevents her 
from using a specific name at all, since the fact mentioned in the alleged 
presupposition is the fact which crucially determines whether such token 
is indeed a token of a specific name. To be sure, this is not the case for 
demonstratives in García-Carpintero’s account: presuppositions associated 
with demonstratives play a role in fixing the reference, but they do not play 
any role in the individuation of the expression. The fact that there is a 
unique individual being demonstrated in the context is not part of the facts 
which determine whether the expression being used is this or that demon-
strative. That’s why, if such presupposition fails you have nonetheless used 
the demonstrative in question, although inappropriately. Something analo-
gous can be said about the case of definite descriptions. There being a king 
of France plays no role in the individuation of the expression the king of 
France. Hence, you are able to use that very expression (although infelici-
tously) even if the presupposition fails. According to the Mill-Frege theory, 
in turn, being associated with a particular act of naming or being part of 
this or that appellative practice constitute the facts the obtaining of which 
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make it the case that a given token is in fact a token of a specific name. As 
a consequence, if the presupposition fails, i.e. if those facts do not obtain, 
the token you produced is not a token of a specific name at all; at most, 
what you did was tokening a generic name instead, viz. merely a token of 
a phonological or orthographical articulation. 
 In other words, if the descriptive metalinguistic sense in question fig-
ured in a semantic presupposition associated with the name, it should be 
possible to use the name infelicitously, that is, it should be possible to use 
that very name even though the presupposition fails. However, if we take 
the Mill-Frege theory seriously, it seems that it is not possible to do that: 
the Mill-Frege theory makes contexts of use and felicitous contexts of use 
collapse; all contexts of use of a specific name are contexts in which the 
alleged presupposition holds (otherwise, you wouldn’t be using a name at 
all). If what has been said is correct, then the metalinguistic senses dis-
cussed by García-Carpintero are not part of a semantic presupposition. 
 Now, what about the evidence García-Carpintero provides in favour of 
the presuppositional view? The main argument consists in trying to show 
that proper names pass the ‘Hey, wait a minute!’ test:4 
We have been debating what to call the cat we recently adopted; I sup-
port ‘Whiskers’. Other members of my household favour ‘Flaubert’. A 
visit friend asks ‘What is the new cat like?’ Out of the blue, I answer: 
 (2)  Whiskers is adorable. 
A supporter of the alternative name promptly objects: ‘Hey, wait a mi-
nute, I did not know we had agreed on calling it Whiskers!’ (García-
carpintero 2017, 15) 
We can analyse the case in the light of the previous objection. García-
Carpintero presents the Whiskers case as an example of an implicit act of 
naming. The speaker attempts at introducing a specific name for the cat, 
i.e. to make ‘Whiskers’ semantically refer to the cat. If the community ac-
commodates the alleged presupposition the act of naming is successful and 
a new specific name comes into existence. If, in turn, the community  
                                                          
4  I will discuss two other pieces of evidence presented by García-Carpintero in the 
next section, once I sketch the Millian strategy I favour. 
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refuses to conform to that practice, the act is nullified. But the question is, 
if the alleged presupposition fails, i.e. if the act of naming is nullified, has 
the speaker used (infelicitously) a specific name, Whiskers1, which refers 
to the relevant cat?5 If what I have argued in this section is correct, she has 
not. The speaker has tokened a generic name, the phonological articulation 
/Whiskers/, but she has failed to make a specific name out of it. Crucially, 
this is unlike typical cases of semantic presupposition: if the audience fails 
to accommodate the presupposition that there is a king of France after an 
utterance of (1) this does not nullify the fact that the kind of France is a 
legitimate expression of English.6 
                                                          
5  García-Carpintero considers this question for explicit acts of naming of the form 
‘let’s call … N’. He maintains that in those cases the occurrence of N is predicative and 
expresses a metalinguistic predicate whose application conditions involve a generic 
name. I agree with García-Carpintero on this (there is independent evidence that this 
type of occurrences are part of a small-clause involving a predicate – see Matushansky 
2008). However, the question remains concerning implicit acts of naming (like the 
whiskers case) or simple occurrences of proper names in argument position in which 
the alleged presupposition is not satisfied. In this cases no expression of the form ‘let’s 
call … N’ is used and the act of naming, if there is one, can only be implicit. 
6  A reviewer for Organon F brings up some possible counterexamples to my collapse 
argument. The first one is the case of empty names, like the famously discussed exam-
ple of Vulcan. García-Carpintero does not discuss empty names in his paper, but we can 
apply the theory to this case. According to García-Carpintero’s view, the sense associ-
ated with a token of a proper name, e.g. Vulcani, is something like ‘whatever individual 
is picked out in the act of naming instituting the Vulcani-appellative practice to which 
Vulcan belongs’. This sense, in turn, is an ingredient of a semantic presupposition of 
the following form:  
For any use Vulcan of the proper name Vulcani, Vulcan refers to x if and only if x 
is the unique individual picked out in the act of naming instituting the Vulcani-
appellative practice to which Vulcan belongs. 
 The reviewer interprets the right hand of the bi-conditional as involving an exist-
ence presupposition, something like ‘∃x such that x is the unique…’ so that the presup-
position fails if and only if no unique object was picked out in the act of naming. So, 
since there is no unique individual picked out in the act of naming instituting the Vul-
cani-appellative practice, the presupposition fails, hence a token of Vulcani would be 
an infelicitous use of the name Vulcani. If this is correct, there are cases in which we 
see no collapse.  
 I have been interpreting the view differently. On my interpretation, the satisfaction 
of the presupposition does not guarantee that the name has a referent. This is suggested 
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 To sum up. Presuppositions are constrains on felicitous contexts of use. 
So if a name triggers a presupposition you expect there’ll be some felicitous 
uses of the name and some infelicitous uses thereof, depending on whether 
the presupposition is satisfied. But this is not what we see in the case of 
proper names (e.g. in the Whiskers case): if the presupposition is satisfied 
you have a felicitous use of the name; but presupposition failure nullifies 
the act of naming, preventing the name coming into existence. In that case 
you do not have an infelicitous use of the name, because you do not have a 
use of a name at all. Since this is not the behaviour one expects from se-
mantic presuppositions, we must conclude that the metalinguistic descrip-
tion in discussion is not a semantic presupposition. 
                                                          
by García-Carpintero’s treatment of the Whiskers case, one of the examples of presup-
position failure he discusses. In that case, the problem is not that the name does not 
refer, but that the act of naming failed. It is also the more charitable interpretation of 
the view if one considers Vulcan examples in the light of the ‘Hey, wait a minute!’ test: 
 A: Vulcan is a planet  
 B: #Hey, wait a minute! Vulcan does not refer to anything! 
If my interpretation is correct, however, the alleged presupposition associated with the 
name is in fact satisfied in Vulcan examples: the token of the name in fact refers to 
whatever individual is picked out in the original act of naming (since there is no indi-
vidual picked out in the act of naming instituting the Vulcani-appellative practice to 
which Vulcan belongs, Vulcan does not refer).  
 Secondly, the reviewer suggests that if one’s metasemantics of ‘semantic reference’ 
for uses of proper names includes not only the intentions of the speaker but also the 
availability of such intentions to the audience, there might be infelicitous uses of proper 
names too. As I understand the suggestion, those would be uses in which a token of a 
name is appropriately related with a certain appellative practice and the speaker uses 
the name with the intention to refer to the unique individual fixed by that practice, but 
such intentions are not available to the audience. However, it is important to point out 
that this would constitute a non-trivial departure from García-Carpintero’s view. Spe-
cifically, it would introduce requisites concerning the intentions of both speaker and 
audience into the presuppositions associated with proper names. Maybe this alternative 
view escapes my collapse argument, but (i) the view still has to be shown to be plausible 
and (ii) I don’t think these cases threat the collapse argument as an argument against 
García-Carpintero’s current version of the Mill-Frege theory. 
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3. A Millian story 
 According to the Mill-Frege theory, an act of naming creates a specific 
name, Ni, and fixes a referent for it, thereby instituting an appellative prac-
tice related to that name. A certain token is a token of Ni only insomuch as 
it exploits that appellative practice, in which case it refers to whatever ob-
ject is fixed by the original act of naming, contributing only that object to 
truth conditions. Now, García-Carpintero maintains that the aforemen-
tioned facts figure in the semantics of the name, specifically as part of its 
presupposed content. In this section I sketch a Millian proposal which ac-
counts for the aforementioned facts without making them part of the se-
mantics of the name (not even in the broad sense of ‘semantics’ adopted by 
García-Carpintero). 
 In a Millian framework one can think of acts of naming and appellative 
practices as a collection of non-semantic (social, psychological, causal) 
facts7 which ground a number of semantic facts: (i) the fact that there exists 
a certain specific name Ni, which possess a certain semantic reference—in 
the Kaplanian vocabulary, a constant character which outputs the same ob-
ject, 𝑖𝑖, in every context—and is conventionally associated with a certain 
phonological string /N/, and (ii) the fact that a particular token of the pho-
nological string /N/ is in fact a token of Ni, which inherits its linguistic 
features. Within this view, the mere fact that a token n is produced as a 
token of the specific name Ni, conveys (in some sense of ‘convey’ to be 
specified) the information that the previously mentioned social, psycholog-
ical and causal facts obtain. In other words, it conveys the information that 
an appellative practice is in force, traceable to an original act of naming. 
 In order to make sense of this view, it is crucial to find a suitable way 
of understanding ‘convey’ in the previous paragraph, in particular one that 
                                                          
7  A thorough treatment of the numerous facts which determine the semantic reference 
of a proper name is beyond the reach of this article. It will suffice to note that it will 
involve psychological facts, like the existence of certain intentions on the part of lan-
guage users, both in acts of naming which create proper names as in referential uses 
which conform to the practice, sociological facts, in order to account for what Sainsbury 
(2005, 106) calls unwitting baptisms (i.e. events which lead to an unintentional creation 
of an appellative practice) and causal facts (consider again Sainsbury’s view, according 
to which some baptisms require an object-related intention/mental state, for which a 
causal interaction with the object is required).  
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does not involve incorporating the aforementioned facts as part of the se-
mantics of the name. We can find a good candidate in Predelli’s idea of 
use-imparted information (Predelli 2013; 2017), viz. information imparted 
by virtue of extra-semantic regularities encoded in the use of an expression. 
Predelli cashes out this notion in terms of what he denominates settlement. 
There are different forms of settlement, but the relevant in this context is 
Mere Settlement: 
Mere Settlement 
A use of an expression e in a context c merely settlesT a sentence S iff 
whenever c ∈ CUT(e), S is True.8 (cf. Predelli 2013, 32-34) 
That is, a use of an expression e merely settlesT a sentence if and only if 
that sentence is true in every context of use of e of a certain type T.9 By 
way of illustration consider some of Predelli’s examples. Since arguably 
tokening a linguistic expression requires intentional agents, every use of an 
expression in a context c merely settles the sentence ‘there exist, have ex-
isted or will exist intentional agents in cw’. That is, in every context of use 
of any expression the foregoing sentence is true. Likewise, every use of ‘I 
am hungry’ settles ‘there exists, have existed or will exist tokens of a sen-
tence which contains an indexical’. Crucially, this information is not con-
veyed by semantic means, wherever you draw the semantic line: it is infor-
mation imparted by virtue of the peculiarities of linguistic use. 
 Now, the Millian can think of the kind of metalinguistic information 
which García-Carpintero locates at the presuppositional level as use-im-
parted information, merely settled by uses of proper names. According to 
this idea, a context of use of a specific name Ni is a context in which there 
is a token n of Ni, endowed with a particular character, viz. a constant func-
tion which outputs an object i in every context. Now, as we already said, 
on this view tokens are individuated by their belonging to a certain appel-
lative practice and their being related with an original act of naming which 
uniquely fixed its semantic referent. Hence, every context of use of Ni is a 
                                                          
8  Every sentence which is true in virtue of character alone is settled by the use of any 
expression. Mere settlement leaves aside these sentences. 
9  Some sentences can be merely settled for some types of use but not for others. 
However, some sentences can be merely settled for all types of use. 
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context in which at cw at least one expression semantically refers to i, that 
is, a context in which there is at cw a corresponding act of naming/appella-
tive practice which conventionally relates the generic name /N/ to i, so that 
i is the unique individual picked out in the act of naming instituting the Ni-
appellative practice to which n belongs. In other words: every use of a spe-
cific name imparts the information that the non-semantic facts which must 
obtain for the specific name to exist, in fact obtain. Crucially though, this 
is not information encoded in the conventional meaning of the name but 
conveyed in virtue of the fact that a specific name was used. 
 The view roughly sketched above has the virtue of explaining several 
facts discussed by García-Carpintero, which supposedly support the thesis 
that there are metalinguistic senses which belong to the semantics of proper 
names. One of these facts concerns some patterns of inference which ap-
pear to be problematic for Millianism: 
 Peter is hungry 
 ∴ Someone called Peter is hungry 
Although logically invalid, this inference seems acceptable in some cir-
cumstances (see Leckie 2012 and Schoubye 2016). This represents a chal-
lenge for the Millian: it is not possible to account for the acceptability of 
the inference in terms of truth conditional content; but it seems that truth 
conditional content is the only explanatory tool the Millian has at her dis-
posal, since for her names are just tags whose sole semantic contribution is 
the object to which the name refers. The Mill-Frege theory, in turn, can 
offer a straightforward explanation: the inference is not valid in general, 
but it is truth-preserving across felicitous contexts, i.e. contexts in which 
the presupposition of the premise is met and the premise is true. However, 
the Millian view previously sketched can also account for these patterns. 
On this view every use of a proper name Ni merely settles the sentence 
‘someone is called Ni’. Hence, the inference is truth-preserving for every 
context in which the premise is used and is true. 
 Another piece of evidence that García-Carpintero presents as support-
ing the Mill-Frege view has to do with speakers’ awareness of the metalin-
guistic description in question, manifested in their disposition to accom-
modate alleged presuppositions (as it would be the case in the Whiskers 
case, if the audience did not object the assertion). This fact, however, is 
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compatible with a Millian account as the one presented above. On this view 
the existence of a social convention (an appellative practice) which is being 
exploited by the name user is information imparted by extra-semantic 
means, by virtue of it being the fact which individuates the name and 
grounds its having these or those semantic features. Thus, it is expected for 
speakers to be able to somehow recover or become aware of the fact that 
an appellative practice is in place or, to the contrary, to point out that the 
token produced is not associated with any appellative practice, i.e. it is not 
a token of an actual specific name. 
 In addition, we should point out that accommodation alone is not a re-
liable test for presuppositionality. Accommodation involves adjusting the 
‘conversational score’, in Lewis’ terms, so as to ensure (ceteris paribus and 
within certain limits) that the speakers’ utterances will come out true, or 
otherwise acceptable (Lewis 1979). The process might take place in the 
face of presupposed content but also while fixing the values of implicit 
arguments, establishing reference points (‘come’, ‘go’ and so on) or, cru-
cially, resolving lexical or structural ambiguity. So the fact that the audi-
ence is ready to accommodate the proposition that the referent of a certain 
name is called ‘N’ is compatible with the non-presuppositional, Millian po-
sition just outlined: if someone uses an articulation /N/ bare in argument 
position the audience will try to ensure (ceteris paribus and within certain 
limits) that the utterance will come out true or otherwise acceptable. That 
involves accommodating the fact that the articulation employed is that of a 
specific name, i.e. that there is an appellative practice which is being ex-
ploited by the speaker. Put differently, the fact that the audience accommo-
dates is not the semantic fact that the specific name being used refers to 
this or that object, but the pre-semantic fact that the articulation being to-
kened is in fact a specific name. 
4. Conclusion 
 To sum up, we have shown that the Mill-Frege view faces a serious 
problem. On the one hand the claim that names trigger semantic presuppo-
sitions involving a descriptive metalinguistic sense, when combined with 
the theory’s stance concerning the way of individuating specific names, has 
an unwelcome consequence, namely that of making contexts of use and 
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felicitous contexts of use collapse, against presuppositions’ expected be-
haviour. On the other hand, I showed that several facts which allegedly 
support the presuppositional view can be accounted for within a Millian 
approach.  
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